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The Competition Act has been amended to include a new criminal
offence for employers that enter into agreements to fix wages, or
that agree not to solicit or hire each other’s employees. The
amendment will come into force in June 2023. The Competition Bureau
has released draft guidelines on how it will interpret and enforce
the amendment. The key things all employers should know about the
amendment and the guidelines are as follows:
- Audit Your Employment Practices.
Given the possibility of criminal prosecution (and significant
fines and jail terms), employers should review their existing
employment practices, focusing specifically on whether the law
impacts any agreements or communications with third parties that
concern how their employees are compensated or treated, or any
non-solicitation agreements. - Understand Industry-Specific
Implications. The amendment and the guidelines have
different implications for employers in different industries. For
example, “gig economy” employers should assess how this
legislation applies (or not) to contractors who are not traditional
employees. Professional firms should assess how they can
appropriately protect valuable employees who work directly with
clients. - M&A Considerations.
Non-solicitation provisions are common in M&A. The Bureau’s
guidance that it will not “generally” use the new
criminal provision to examine non-solicitation agreements in the
M&A context is helpful. However, the Bureau’s guidance is
not absolute or binding, and care will be required to ensure that
the multitude of agreements that are used in M&A (including
early stage agreements, like NDAs and Exclusivity Agreements) do
not create legal risk.
This update provides background to the amendment to the
Competition Act, and summarizes key insights about different
aspects of the Bureau’s guidelines.
Brief History
The Act was amended through the 2022 Budget Implementation
Act, and the new provision will enter into force June 23,
2023. The impetus for this change includes a number of events:
- In June 2020, Canada’s top three grocery chains
simultaneously retracted their $2-per-hour “hero pay”
raises for front-line workers during the pandemic. This attracted
significant political attention. Subsequently, the Bureau indicated
publicly that the Act’s criminal conspiracy provisions did not
apply to agreements for the “purchase” of labour,
including wage-fixing agreements. - In the US, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and
Federal Trade Commission have been using antitrust legislation to
examine wage-fixing and no-poaching agreements, including following
issuance of their 2016 Antitrust Guidance for Human Resource
Professionals.1 Since that time, the US
DOJ has attempted to prosecute or settled a number of
“naked” no-poach and wage-fixing
agreements.2 - A number of 2020 and 2021 cases in Canada’s federal and
provincial Superior Courts dismissed claims by plaintiffs alleging
wage-fixing and no-poach agreements as not contrary to the
Act’s criminal provisions. Consistent with the Bureau’s
public statements, these decisions emphasized that the intended
effect of the Act’s relevant criminal provisions was aimed at
hardcore cartel agreements whereas other “buy-side” types
of agreements warranted only civil intervention.3
Insights About the Amendment and Guidelines
Regarding Wage-Fixing and No-Poach Agreements
On June 23, 2023, the new criminal provision (section 45(1.1))
will come into force, making it a per se offence for
employers to enter into wage-fixing or no-poach agreements –
in other words, these agreements will be illegal regardless of
their effect on competition.4 The penalty for violating
this new provision includes imprisonment for up to fourteen years
or a fine to be set at the discretion of the court, or both.
The Bureau’s guidelines set out how it will interpret and
enforce this new provision. Here are ten insights about the
amendment and the Bureau’s guidance:
- Affiliated Parties. The amendment does not
apply to employers that are affiliated (i.e., ultimately controlled
by the same entity). Thus, corporate groups can continue to
coordinate their HR matters across all entities within their
organization without risk. - Employers, Not Competitors. The civil
price-fixing provision of the Act applies only to companies that
are “competitors”. By contrast, the amendment applies to
all employers that enter into agreements regarding wages, etc.,
whether or not they compete. The actions of persons acting for
them, including directors, officers, agents, and employees, may be
attributed to the employer, or those individuals may be
“employers” themselves (and therefore subject to the
available sanctions). - Employment Relationship Required. The
amendment applies to agreements in respect of persons in an
employment relationship (which is defined by laws related to
employment and “other circumstances under which the
relationship was entered into”). It is unclear what
“other circumstances” will be relevant, but it is
questionable whether a court would enter a criminal conviction for
any conduct in respect of persons whom employment law would not
recognize as being in an employee-employer relationship. - Conscious Parallelism. While it is not a
violation for a business to act independently with awareness of the
likely response of other employers or in response to the conduct of
other employers (“conscious parallelism”), the guidelines
warn the Bureau may attempt to treat parallel conduct paired with
other facilitating practices (e.g., exchanging information about
each other’s employment practices) as a violation. The
guidelines suggest that merely “taking steps to monitor”
other employers’ practices could be a facilitating practice,
but there is no modern history of Canadian courts accepting that
mere monitoring of a rival constitutes an agreement. - Terms and Conditions of Employment. The
guidelines warn that the prohibition on wage-fixing will extend to
any “terms of employment” so long as it “could
affect a person’s decision to enter into or remain in an
employment contract.” This broad language could apply to a
range of HR matters, including a company’s vacation policies or
pandemic-return-to-work policies. While the Bureau will likely
exercise discretion about which types of cases to investigate or
enforce, private litigants could use this broad language to bring
private actions in provincial Superior Courts or the Federal
Court. - Reciprocity Not Required, Except When it Is.
The guidelines counsel that, because of the specific language of
the amendment, it is a crime for Company A to enter into an
agreement with Company B about Company A’s wages (but not
Company B’s). However, it is not a crime for Company A to agree
not to poach Company B’s employees unless Company B also agrees
not to poach Company A’s employees. - Dealing with Unions. The amendment applies to
all employees, including unionized labour. However, the guidelines
do not explain how the amendment interacts with other laws that
govern unionized labour, including section 4(1)(c) of the
Competition Act. That section expressly permits agreements between
two or more employers in “a trade, industry or
profession” that pertains “to collective bargaining with
their employees in respect of salary or wages and terms or
conditions of employment.” - Risk of Private Actions. The amendment creates
a criminal offence. Under the Competition Act, private parties can
bring private damages suits or seek other orders for such offences
before provincial Superior Courts or the Federal Court, including
class actions. Employers should understand how plaintiffs’
lawyers, unions or other stakeholders might attempt to use the
amendment in private actions. - Some Protection for M&A and Joint Ventures, But
Questions Remain. The amendment is subject to the
“ancillary restraints defence”, which shields restrictive
agreements from criminal prosecution provided they are (i)
ancillary to a broader and separate agreement that is not illegal,
and (ii) directly related and reasonably necessary for that other
agreement. The guidelines confirm the Bureau will not
“generally” assess wage-fixing or no-poaching clauses
that are ancillary to mergers or joint ventures under the criminal
provision, or “second guess” the restrictions created by
employers in these contexts. However, the guidelines do not provide
counsel about when restrictions can be utilized in common types of
M&A agreements where provisions related to employees are
frequently found (e.g., NDAs, Exclusivity Agreements, Purchase
Agreements, Transition Services Agreements). Careful planning with
competition counsel will be required. - Non-Compete Agreements Not Impacted. The US
Federal Trade Commission has recently proposed a rule that would
ban non-compete provisions from employment contracts in the US. The
amendment and the guidelines do not apply to non-compete provisions
in employment contracts, and those agreements remain legal under
Canadian competition law.
For further information on these guidelines or the amendment to
the Act, please contact any member of our Competition and Foreign Investment Group.
Footnotes
1 US Department of Justice Antitrust
Division and Federal Trade Commission, “Antitrust Guidance for
Human Resource Professionals”, October
2016.
2 For instance, see United States v.
Jindal, No. 4:20-CR-00358, ECF No. 56 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 29,
2021) and United States v. DaVita Inc., No. 21-cr-00229,
ECF No. 264 (D. Colo. Apr. 15, 2022).
3 See Mohr v. National Hockey League,
2021 FC 488 and Latifi v The TDL Group Corp, 2021 BCSC
2183.
4 Like other criminal provisions under s. 45
of the Act, a per se offence is behaviour that is deemed
to be illegal without requiring proof of anti-competitive
effects
The content of this article does not constitute legal advice
and should not be relied on in that way. Specific advice should be
sought about your specific circumstances.
POPULAR ARTICLES ON: Antitrust/Competition Law from Canada
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